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Introduction 
The custom of dowry in Indian marriages is a deep-seated cultural phenomenon 
that has been described as one of the largest obstacles to “confront India on her road to 
economic and social justice (Dreze and Sen).”  Indeed, one of India’s greatest social 
failures is the extraordinarily high level of gender inequality and female deprivation that 
has persisted in the nation for the last several decades through cultural practices such as 
dowry.  The custom is held responsible for a number of problems perpetrated against the 
nation’s women, including dowry violence, bride burning, and wife murder.  Although 
unanimously regarded by legislators and scholars as a perpetrator of social detriment 
against women, the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 that outlawed the practice has been 
remarkably unsuccessful in reducing the frequency of its occurrence.  In fact, not only 
has the demand for dowry not been eliminated, it has become increasingly popular among 
the upper echelons of the Hindu society where it originated and has become widespread 
even among various communities of Muslims, Christians, and tribal groups all across 
India (Sheel 26).  The failure of legislation to eliminate the payment of dowry in Indian 
marriages likely stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of both the effects and more 
importantly, the causes of the practice. 
I argue that dowries exist because of a combination of two reasons.  First, there is an 
excess supply of women in the Indian marriage market that results in the use of dowry as 
an equilibrating mechanism.  Secondly, a differential in the patterns of human capital 
accumulation of men and women have led to a larger positive benefit from marriage for 
women than for men, the net difference of which is theoretically equivalent to the amount 
of the dowry.  Both these explanations for the existence of dowry are fundamentally 
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grounded in the powerful social and cultural ideologies of marriage held by the vast 
majority of Indian society.  Furthermore, the phenomena of dowry-related violence and 
female infanticide, which are the cause of substantial detriment to the social welfare of 
Indian women, are intimately linked with and probably symptomatic of the dowry 
tradition.  Legal and other strategies must be used to eliminate both the root causes of the 
dowry tradition as well as address its grave outward symptoms. 
 
Definition of Dowry 
Historically, dowry has been an integral and institutionalized aspect of traditional 
arranged Hindu marriage.  Over hundreds of years, however, the definition of the term 
has evolved from the ceremonial and voluntary gift giving of the bride’s family to a form 
of monetary extortion demanded by the groom’s family.  Studies on the origins of the 
tradition postulate that dowry originally and ideally denoted gifts of kanyadana, such as 
ornaments, expensive clothes and other precious items referenced in ancient texts on 
marriage ritual, voluntarily presented to both the bride and groom’s families during the 
time of marriage (Sheel 17).  Moreover, the practice was derived from the high cultural 
and spiritual merit accorded to gift givers and gift giving in the Vedas and other Hindu 
literature.  As such, dowry was originally used as a means to both sanctify material 
wealth and also enhance social status in marriage. 
The modern phenomenon of dowry, however, reflects a change in the system such 
that the presentation of gifts no longer remains a voluntary process.  Presently in India, 
bride’s families are often compelled to provide dowry in the name of gift giving.  
Evaluated in terms of total cash value, the amount of the dowry is negotiated by the 
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groom’s family based on their social and economic status.  The higher the socioeconomic 
status of the groom’s family, the higher the dowry demanded (Sheel 18).  The exact 
negotiation for dowry is often done through a mediator so that the marriage retains some 
semblance of sanctity and does not appear to be an entirely monetary transaction.  The 
modern practice of dowry, therefore, is characterized by a shift from voluntary to forced 
gift giving, as well as the primary role of the groom’s family in determining the demand 
for gifts from the bride’s family. 
In the way it is currently understood, the term dowry is a broad reference to the 
totality of assets transferred from the bride’s family to the groom’s at the time of a 
marriage.  The total transfer can be broken down into three basic parts.  Firstly, there are 
the property transfers to the bride, which according to Indian law should legally be under 
her name and control.  Second, there are those gifts that continue to be part of the 
ceremonial aspect of the marriage and symbolize union between the two families.  
Ideally, these would be matched by reciprocal gifts of equal value from the groom’s 
family.  Finally, there are those assets that can be called “marriage payments” and are 
given “with the explicit understanding that without them the marriage contract will be 
voided (Sen 78).”  In an economic analysis, it is this final aspect that constitutes the 
actual significant economic cost of dowry for a bride’s family, and is perhaps the most 
costly among the three aspects of the dowry. 
 
The Marriage Market 
The economic underpinnings and causes of dowry can only be fully understood 
within the framework of economic theory on marriage.  Established economic theory 
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views the market for marriage as one in which people bargain for a spouse who 
maximizes their utility gains from marriage (Becker).  Traditional Indian Hindu 
marriages can operate within this framework, but with one clear distinction—these 
marriages are almost always arranged by the families of the prospective spouses.  
Families search the marriage market for suitable matches, examining quantifiable 
characteristics such as age, caste, socioeconomic background, labor market earnings for 
men, and household labor skills (such as cooking, cleaning, and childbearing) for women.  
Eventually, it is the family, and not just the individual, which makes the final decision as 
to whether or not the marriage will take place.  The concept of arranged marriage does to 
some extent confound the fundamental economic principles of individual choice in 
marriage, but for simplicity’s sake, the assumption is made that there is a single utility 
function for both the individual and his or her family. 
 
Customs of Indian Marriage 
Societal and religious dictates have had a profound effect on Indian Hindu marital 
conventions.  As already mentioned, the marriages are normally arranged by the families 
of the prospective spouses.  This phenomenon essentially precludes any potential “love” 
marriages, as these marriages are looked down upon by the community, especially if the 
bride and groom are not of comparable caste and socioeconomic status.  Other marital 
codes are particularly strict for women.  Most Indian communities impose an unofficial 
age limit by which time young women must be married.  Although the age varies 
somewhat from region to region, families that fail to marry off their daughters by such a 
time are subject to the gravest censure and shame.  Beyond the immediate consequence 
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where the family will be forced to financially support an unmarried daughter for the rest 
of her life, the social condemnation that accompanies such a situation also carries with it 
the weight of economic penalization.  Often, the offending family will lose employees, 
customers, and general goodwill in the market (Sen 77).  Another implication of 
traditional Indian custom is that a daughter, once married, belongs to and must live with 
her husband’s family.  Any labor market earnings and household skills of the bride 
become the assets of the husband’s family, and any sustenance costs become their 
liability.  Furthermore, as per the tradition of Indian families, all assets (such as wages or 
dowry) and all liabilities (sustenance costs such as food, clothing, and shelter) of the 
bride are pooled with those of other members of the family.  The parents-in-law then 
make the final decisions about how the income should be spent or saved (Sharma 342).  
As such, in the traditional Indian household, individual rights become subsidiary to those 
of the family-in-law.  These three aspects of the traditions of Indian marriage—the social 
mandate requiring women to be married by a young age, the transfer of all financial 
assets and liabilities of a bride to the groom’s family, and the household pooling of 
resources—constitute the dominant cultural, social, and ideological forces that have led 
to the existence and persistence of dowry in Indian society. 
 
Causes of Dowry 
Economic theory, which views the market for marriage as one in which people 
bargain for a spouse who maximizes their utility gains from marriage, when combined 
with the realities of various sociological factors, presents an interesting perspective on the 
reasons behind the existence of the dowry system in India.  Under the assumption of a 
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perfectly competitive marriage market with perfect information, the existence of a dowry 
can be seen as the combined result of a few different forces. 
 
The “Marriage Squeeze” and Excess Supply of Wives 
Theoretical work by economists on marriage transactions has stipulated that 
dowries are likely to occur when equilibrium conditions result in an excess supply of 
women who want to marry and enter the marriage market (Grossbard-Shectman).  An 
excess supply of women, or a relative scarcity of men in the marriage market, can be 
equilibrated through the use of the marital cost of dowry.  In theory, the monetary cost of 
the dowry increases as the supply of women wanting to marry rises, shifting the supply 
curve enough to balance the demand for wives. 
Some scholars have argued that the excess supply argument is suspect for the case 
of Indian society because the nation’s gender-ratio imbalance is notoriously tilted 
towards fewer women than men, rather than reverse (Sen 80).  In fact, the country’s 
female-male ratio has declined from 972 women per thousand men in 1901 to less than 
927 women per thousand men in 1991 (Dreze and Sen).  However, there is a fundamental 
flaw in examining the total gender ratio as an indicator of the relative supply of women in 
the marriage market, for certain social customs of Indian society cause distinct 
peculiarities in the way the Indian marriage market is divided between men and women. 
In India, Hindu marriages are based on social and religious beliefs that allow men 
to marry at virtually any age, while women are required to marry by a much younger age.  
Although the maximum age limit for marriage varies for women in different regions of 
India, the central belief is that a daughter who remains unmarried after the socially 
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determined age will thereafter be ineligible for marriage, and as such, will bring to her 
family social disgrace, the financial liability of her sustenance, and certain types of 
economic sanctions imposed by the rest of the community.   The most significant 
implication of such an ideology is that the Indian marriage market becomes divided into 
an older male cohort and a much younger female cohort.  Thus, the actual gender ratio in 
the Indian marriage market cannot be detected in the nation’s total gender ratio or even in 
same age group or same time period gender ratios.  Instead, it is the relative numbers of 
the younger female cohort as compared with the older male cohort that determines the 
true ratio of eligible men and women who want to marry.  This peculiar gender division 
leads to some key insight about the rising costs of dowry, for the structure of India’s 
marriage market is highly affected by one of the nation’s greatest obstacles to social and 
economic progress: population growth. 
Recent empirical work has shown that India’s surge in population growth over the last 
several decades has led to a “marriage squeeze (Rao 666).”  In theory, a “marriage 
squeeze” means that a population with a declining mortality rate and increasing birth rate 
will have larger younger cohorts than older ones.  Because women tend to marry older 
men in Indian society, the eligible women in India’s marriage market would therefore 
belong to a younger and hence larger cohort.  Essentially, a high population growth 
would lead to a gender ratio in the marriage market characterized by a surplus of women, 
and the amount of this surplus would depend on the actual rate of population growth.  A 
“marriage squeeze,” therefore, by causing an increase in the supply of women in the 
marriage market, would also cause an upward shift in the amount of dowry needed to 
equilibrate that market. 
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In one region of southern India, data and research estimate that the marriage squeeze ratio 
has caused a “significant increase in net real dowry transfers over time (Rao 672).”  In 
considering this trend as a result of the surplus of women in the marriage market, it is 
also important to note that the area studied was a region in which female mortality at 
younger ages exceeds male mortality.  In fact, the gender ratio in the region has tilted 
towards more men than women in the total population ever since the turn of the century.  
The surplus of women over men at marriageable ages, therefore, indicates that the 
population growth was large enough to outweigh the fact there have always been more 
women than men within the same age cohort.  India’s alarmingly high population growth 
led to a subsequent increase in the size of the younger female cohort in the marriage 
market, thereby inducing a “marriage squeeze” that can be held at least partly responsible 
for the existence of as well as the recent increase in costs of dowries. 
 
Divergent Patterns of Human Capital Accumulation 
The theory of the “marriage squeeze,” based on the Indian social phenomenon 
where younger women tend to marry older men, uses India’s high population growth of 
the last several decades to explain the increase in the average cost of dowries.  However, 
the other prevalent customs and attitudes of Indian marriage are another extremely 
significant aspect of the economic rational for why the practice of dowry persists in 
Indian society.  Aside from the excess supply of women in the marriage market already 
discussed, the existence of dowry may alternatively be attributed to an inherent 
differential between the gains from marriage for men and women.  This explanation has 
one very important implication: the benefits of marriage for women exceed the benefits 
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gained from marriage by men.  It is thus the net difference between these marital gains 
that the groom’s family appropriates as dowry, or “marriage payment.”  The discrepancy 
in marital gains can be seen as having two components.  Firstly, traditional social norms 
inhibit the acquisition of market-oriented human capital by women and instead 
p30romote procurement of household-oriented human capital, which in turn can only be 
fully utilized within the context of marriage.  Secondly, individual and family utility, 
which in economic theory is generally defined as “well-being” or “happiness,” is derived 
not only from the consumption of material goods, but also from a desire to uphold a good 
name and reputation in a community by adhering to its prevalent social and cultural 
beliefs.  Neoclassical economic theory fails to take into account the utility derived from 
social acceptance, but it is only by understanding the social and ideological forces of 
Indian society that it becomes possible to fully understand the economic and market 
forces that have led to the existence of dowry. 
In this context, two broad categories of human capital can be defined: market 
specific human capital, which contributes to productivity and earnings potential in the 
labor market, and household specific human capital, which contributes to productivity 
and skills that increase the social status of the household and family (Sen, Pollack).  
Capital accumulation decisions are made during childhood by parents and families.  It is 
assumed that market specific human capital generally requires monetary investment, and 
is obtained through formal education and training, while household specific capital can 
generally be acquired without any monetary investment through training and work in the 
household under the supervision of a senior female member of the household. 
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It is reasonable to assume that families consider several factors when making 
decisions about human capital investment for their children.  These include the utility 
derived from their children’s preferences, the family utility derived from adhering to 
social customs regarding the appropriate forms of capital accumulation for different 
genders, and finally, the expected rate of return on the family’s monetary investment into 
children’s market specific human capital.  In this context, three prevalent features of 
Indian society will be discussed in their relevance to decisions regarding the acquisition 
of human capital for women. 
Perhaps the most basic phenomenon of Indian marriage is that a daughter, once married, 
essentially becomes the property of her husband’s family.  All assets, including any labor 
market earnings, household skills, and dowry, are transferred to the family-in-law.  Sons, 
however, are almost always the source of future income and dependence for parents 
during their old age.  As such, money invested into the acquisition of market specific 
human capital for a son is usually regarded as a form of investment into parents’ future 
consumption.  Monetary investment into a daughter’s acquisition of human capital, 
however, returns no specific financial yield, although there may be benefits accrued due 
to any utility parents may derive from the happiness of their children.  Such financial 
circumstances help explain the widespread decision of Indian households to allocate most 
or all resources intended for children’s consumption to the investment of market specific 
human capital for sons, while daughters are generally forced to invest in the zero cost 
acquisition of household specific human capital (Sen 82). 
The investment decisions made by Indian families regarding the acquisition of human 
capital for their children are likely to be influenced by the large differential in labor 
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market earnings between men and women.  Many studies have determined that there is an 
enormous amount of wage discrimination in the Indian labor market (Duraiswamy and 
Duraiswamy).  In particular, research has shown that Indian women with post-secondary 
schooling earn about 21% less than Indian men, and that about 67-77% of this wage gap 
may be attributed to discrimination. The primary significance of this wage discrepancy in 
decisions of human capital acquisition is that investment into market specific human 
capital for daughters yields a much lower expected real rate of return than such 
investment for sons.  The wage discrepancy in the labor market is another reason that 
Indian parents tend to invest less in market specific human capital for their daughters, as 
they realize that the yield from such an investment in terms of labor market earnings 
would be relatively meager 
In addition to rationally and economically analyzing the expected return on investment, 
Indian families are also heavily influenced by the strong social and cultural beliefs that 
view the acquisition of economic resources by women with intense antagonism.  Indian 
social structural ideologies have long regarded women as the stable foundation of the 
family.  Appropriate responsibilities for women have generally been limited to household 
tasks such as childbearing, cooking, cleaning, and other social and religious activities 
such as singing for community events or planning religious ceremonies known as pujas.  
Moreover, excessive education or “education of the wrong kind, such as education that 
grants her the means of economic self-sufficiency, increases the probability that a girl 
will gain an unseemly amount of independence, violate her traditional role and disrupt 
familial and societal harmony in the future (Sen 83).”  Depending on a family’s 
adherence to such prevailing social attitudes, daughters are for yet another reason 
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generally restricted to developing only household oriented skills, while sons are allocated 
the funding needed to gain market skills through school, college, and job training. 
Thus, due to a variety of both economic and social reasons, women in Indian societies are 
raised with a much higher proportion of household specific human capital relative to 
market specific human capital.  The most significant implication of the discrepancy in 
patterns of human capital accumulation for men and women is on the relative benefits 
they receive in marriage.  The most fundamental characteristic of household specific 
human capital is that it can be fully utilized only within the married state.  For example, 
the benefits of skills such as those specific to bearing and raising children become 
irrelevant out of marriage, for out-of-wedlock and divorced motherhood are considered 
among the greatest social disgraces for Indian women, often provoking severe censure 
and disdain by the community at large. Consequently, women who have acquired large 
amounts of household specific human capital stand to receive two major benefits from 
marriage.  First, there is an increase in consumption and utility derived from a society 
that regards marriage in high esteem.  And secondly, there is the increase in utility 
derived from the complete utilization of acquired household specific human capital (Sen 
84).  While the former applies to men and women equally, the latter is a benefit specific 
to women who have been raised in traditional households that restricted their capital 
accumulation to household oriented skills.  In such cases, the women will have an 
inevitably larger gain from marriage than men will, and the net difference would be 
equalized through the payment of an appropriate amount of dowry. 
Both the “marriage squeeze” theory of excess supply of women in the marriage 
market as well the theory of divergent patterns of human capital accumulation rationalize 
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the existence of dowry in Indian society based on one critical factor: traditional Indian 
social values.  In the theory of the “marriage squeeze,” population growth has only 
affected the size of the female cohort in the marriage market because of the social values 
that compel women to be married by a certain age.  In the theory of divergent human 
capital accumulation, social mandates, such as those that limit the procurement of human 
capital for daughters to household oriented skills, as well as those that force women to 
transfer all assets to the family-in-law after marriage, inevitably put many women in 
situations where they must rely on marriage for economic sustenance.  Examined from 
this perspective, the main evil behind the perpetuation of the dowry tradition lies in the 
restrictive and frequently detrimental Indian social views on marriage.  The effect of 
dowry on the welfare of Indian society, however, is further complicated by certain social 
ills that are inextricably linked with the tradition.  Such effects, which include dowry-
related violence and abuse, bride burning, wife murder, and female infanticide, constitute 
some of the most highly detrimental ills perpetrated against Indian women. 
 
Effects of Dowry 
The provisions and acts against dowry in the Indian legal code are largely ineffective.  
The phenomenon is too pervasive and too prevalent in rural communities (where civil 
law is hardly understood let alone observed) to be influenced by basically any kind of 
legal statutes.  Moreover, studies have shown that a majority of police and other security 
officials regard dowry as a family issue in which the law, the government, or the police 
should not interfere (Sheel 128).  As such, the expected punishment for violating legal 
codes regarding dowry is practically zero, and families continue to practice the giving of 
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dowry according to tradition.  Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the legal codes also 
means that the dowry is essentially irrecoverable upon termination of the marriage.  The 
lack of legal enforcement of laws pertaining to the family results in a depressing but 
economically legitimate rational for the perpetration of two very serious social ills: wife 
murder and female infanticide. 
 
Dowry-related Wife Abuse and Murder 
Because of the practically nonexistent expected punishment for legal violations 
concerning dowry and because men in Indian society do not generally face any negative 
economic or societal consequences upon dissolution of a marriage, the existence of 
dowry in effect induces a man to eliminate his current wife if the expected gains from 
doing so exceed the gains from continuing to be with her. Essentially, a man who can 
gain more from the potential dowry of a second marriage than from the benefits of 
remaining with his first wife is more likely to murder his current wife, especially if there 
is a low probability of conviction.  In a similar vein, wife abuse may be used as a means 
of inducing a woman to leave a marriage, thereby allowing the husband to contract a 
second marriage and appropriate a second dowry without the legal risk (however small) 
of committing murder (Sen 93).  Although this economic rational has yet to be 
adequately substantiated through empirical research, the argument is convincing 
particularly in light of the incredible pervasiveness of dowry-related wife abuse and 
murder. 
Incidents of violence and murders of wives due to issues of dowry first began to be 
reported in the early 1980’s.  Stories emerged of women who were burned to death, 
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beaten and abused, murdered, and who committed suicide because of families-in-law 
who relentless harassed brides on issues related to insufficient dowry.  By 1994, the 
Home Ministry’s National Crime Record Bureau clocked a ‘dowry death’ at every 102 
minutes (Sheel 129).  In a country where people rarely report acts of domestic violence, 
however, even these grossly disturbing figures likely represent only a fraction of the 
actual dowry deaths that took place during these years (Bumiller 48).  These horrific 
episodes of violence and murder can be seen as the combined result of an inadequately 
enforced legal system along with an age-old tradition that inherently undermines the 
relative economic self-sufficiency of women. 
 
Female Infanticide 
In a similar vein, the dowry system may be seen as partly responsible for the female 
infanticide that occurs all over rural India.  Because of the same lack of legal enforcement 
that has exacerbated dowry-related abuse and murder, the phenomenon of female 
infanticide is prevalent among Indian families (particularly in rural communities) where 
the additional cost of dowry for a third or fourth daughter may greatly exceed the 
family’s financial capacity.  Again, economic empirical work has yet to explore this 
correlation, but the raw data and prevalent attitudes are staggering.  Government 
employed midwives revealed in interviews that they “feared for a newborn’s life if it was 
so unfortunate as to be the third or fourth girl born into a poor family of farm 
laborers…such a family could not possibly afford the price of another girl’s 
dowry…‘putting the child to sleep’…seemed their only choice (Bumiller 102).” 
 16 
 
     http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
Both dowry-related murders as well as female infanticide are unfortunate and 
highly deleterious symptoms of India’s dowry system.  Imposing a highly negative 
impact on the social welfare of women in Indian society, these phenomena must be 
addressed as what they are—symptoms of a more significant root problem: that is, the 
prevailing social and cultural ideology that led to the existence of dowry in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
Elimination of dowry and of the negative impact it impresses on Indian social welfare 
requires a twofold system of policies.  Firstly, the domestic violence, murder, and female 
infanticide that result from the dowry tradition must be abolished through increased 
enforcement of legal provisions such as those in the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961.  By 
vehemently prosecuting and convicting perpetrators of dowry violence, the expected 
punishment could be increased enough to offset the benefits of committing such dowry-
related crime, thereby reducing the overall frequency of occurrence.  Secondly, given that 
crimes related to dowry are rooted in dominant Indian social, religious, and ideological 
forces, the complete eradication of dowry can only be attained when these social and 
religious attitudes are forced to change. 
It has been examined in this paper that the two primary causes of dowry are the excess 
supply of women in the Indian marriage market and the systematic under-accumulation 
of market specific human capital by women that causes a discrepancy in marital gains for 
men and women.  In order to stop the perpetuation of the dowry tradition and its 
associated social ills, the relative gains from marriage for men and women must first be 
equalized.  This can only be accomplished through a fundamental shift in Indian social 
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attitudes about both marriage and women.  Perceptions about appropriate roles for 
women must evolve to include education and employment, the current requirement that 
brides surrender all future assets to in-laws must be changed so that parents can depend 
on daughters as well as sons in their old age, and finally, the government must undertake 
sustained action to prevent employment and wage discrimination against women in the 
labor market.  Unfortunately, there is an enormous period of lag time between the time 
when calls for social change are actually made and the time when societal beliefs and 
customs actually begin to transform.  Today, dowry continues to be a socially accepted 
and rational outcome of the current Indian marriage market.  True progress in the 
elimination of the dowry system will only come through endeavors to create awareness 
among Indian communities about the negative effects of dowry, through programs and 
government sanctions that endorse education and employment for women of all ages, and 
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